CHKEPOINT

If the United States has agreed to, signed, or accepted a new Iran-US nuclear deal before Jan 1, 2027, then the market resolves to Yes.

An agreement also made with other countries (i.e. multilaterally) is still encompassed if the United States participates. "A new Iran-US nuclear deal" means a formal written agreement signed by authorized representatives of both the United States and Iran that (1) imposes verifiable restrictions on Iran's nuclear program, including limits on uranium enrichment, centrifuge numbers, or nuclear facility operations, AND (2) provides for the lifting, suspension, or modification of at least one US economic sanction on Iran in exchange for Iran's nuclear commitments. Clarification (04/19/26): The Agreement Long rulebook variable defines the nature of the qualifying instrument: it must be a formal written agreement signed by authorized representatives of both governments. It does not impose a precondition that the signing itself must occur before resolution. Because the Payout Criterion is satisfied if the United States has "agreed to, signed, or accepted" such an instrument, both governments publicly and officially agreeing to the terms of what will be a qualifying written agreement is sufficient to resolve the market to Yes, even if the formal signing has not yet taken place. Clarification (06/02/26): A qualifying instrument must impose "verifiable restrictions on Iran's nuclear program." A restriction is "verifiable" only where it establishes a concrete, objectively ascertainable standard (a defined limit, prohibition, quantity, or monitoring provision) against which compliance could in principle be confirmed; a general expression of intent that fixes no such standard is not considered “verifiable” for the purposes of this event. Accordingly, a bare pledge not to develop or pursue nuclear weapons, unaccompanied by any concrete limit on Iran's nuclear materials, activities, or facilities, does not on its own satisfy criterion (1). Conversely, a commitment to completely 'stop' or ‘suspend’ a specific nuclear activity (such as uranium enrichment) establishes a concrete prohibition (an implicit limit of zero) and qualifies as a restriction, whereas a vague promise to 'reduce' activities without a defined metric or monitoring mechanism does not. The enumerated examples (limits on uranium enrichment, centrifuge numbers, or nuclear facility operations) are illustrative and not exhaustive: a formal, verifiable commitment to remove, transfer, or cap Iran's stock of enriched uranium, confirmable by the receiving state or an oversight body, is a restriction on Iran's nuclear program and satisfies criterion (1). In every case, criterion (2) must independently be met. Clarification (06/17/26): To clarify, the U.S.–Iran memorandum of understanding reportedly now in effect does not satisfy criterion (1) of the definition of a "new Iran-US nuclear deal," and this market will therefore not resolve to Yes on the basis of that instrument at this time. The memorandum provides for the existing state of Iran's nuclear program to be maintained pending a subsequent agreement, and defers the disposition of Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium to a mechanism to be mutually agreed in that subsequent agreement. That it states a minimum methodology for that future mechanism — down-blending on site under IAEA supervision — constrains the form of a mechanism yet to be agreed, but specifies no quantity, enrichment level, or completion deadline for the down-blending. An instrument that provides for maintaining Iran's nuclear program at an unspecified status quo, or that defers its substantive nuclear commitments to a subsequent agreement, does not by itself establish the concrete, objectively ascertainable standard that a "verifiable" restriction requires.

On June 14, 2026, the United States and Iran announced a written diplomatic agreement, including a 60-day extendable period in which both countries committed to negotiate toward a “final deal” regarding Iran’s nuclear program and other topics. This market resolves to “Yes” if a qualifying written diplomatic instrument between the United States and Iran has been mutually signed or adopted by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market resolves to “No.” Unless the written instrument is formally adopted without signature as described below, the instrument must be signed by both the United States and Iran. Both parties must either sign the same document or sign individual documents that substantively and directly indicate acceptance of the same underlying instrument, regardless of minor formatting, wording, or translation differences between the signed versions. Both physical signatures and officially-issued electronic signatures will qualify as signatures. If the written instrument is recognized by the United States and Iran as not requiring signature for execution, formal adoption of the instrument by both countries without signature will qualify. Formal adoption may be established by official actions, including: (i) an official joint statement announcing that the United States and Iran have adopted, approved, executed, concluded, or otherwise finalized the instrument; (ii) mutual official confirmation that the same published instrument has been agreed to, adopted, approved, executed, or concluded by both countries; (iii) adoption, approval, or endorsement through an official resolution, ministerial decision, executive decision, or equivalent institutional act, where that act is the mechanism by which the relevant country adopts the instrument; or (iv) an exchange of official diplomatic notes or letters confirming acceptance of the same instrument. A qualifying written diplomatic instrument must: (i) Be identified as the final deal contemplated by the June 14, 2026, memorandum of understanding, either in official United States or Iranian communications, or by a consensus of credible reporting; (ii) Establish at least one specific obligation limiting Iran's nuclear program through a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested, which may take the form of a defined limit, prohibition, or quantity (e.g., a specific cap on the purity level to which Iran may enrich uranium, or an explicit commitment for Iran to surrender, destroy, or dilute its enriched uranium stockpile). Non-specific or vague restrictions, with no defined metric (e.g., a pledge not to pursue nuclear weapons, a commitment to maintain the status quo, or an agreement to abide IAEA monitoring or inspections requirements that do not specifically restrict Iran’s nuclear program) will not qualify. The content of the qualifying instrument must be expressed as an agreed obligation to be implemented. The following do not qualify: (i) a provision the substantive obligation of which remains explicitly subject to a future agreement, negotiation process, or mutually agreed follow-on instrument; (ii) a provision explicitly framed as a minimum requirement for a future negotiation, rather than a present obligation; (iii) a floor, placeholder, or minimum standard established explicitly for the purpose of structuring ongoing or future talks. A definite and unconditional obligation may qualify, even if technical or procedural details, including the exact implementation date, timeframe, or sequencing, remain subject to future arrangements, provided that the obligation still establishes a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested. Conditional obligations do not qualify. Whether an instrument qualifies will be primarily determined by its officially released text. A qualifying instrument must be signed or formally adopted by both the United States and Iran by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. If such an instrument is signed or formally adopted by that time, but the complete text has not been released, and genuine material ambiguity remains as to whether it satisfies this market’s requirements, this market may remain open for up to 28 calendar days after the specified date pending release of the text. If the text has still not been released after 28 calendar days, official and definitive announcements from the United States or Iran, and a consensus of credible reporting, will be used to determine whether the instrument qualifies. An instrument to which parties other than the United States and Iran are also party will qualify, provided that both the United States and Iran are parties to the instrument and all other requirements are satisfied. Once a diplomatic instrument has been signed or formally adopted without signature by both the United States and Iran and confirmed to satisfy the requirements of a qualifying written diplomatic instrument, this market’s condition is met, regardless of whether the instrument later enters into force, is ratified, receives legislative or treaty consent, or is subsequently repudiated, withdrawn from, or not implemented by the United States or Iran. The primary resolution sources for this market will be official communications from the governments of the United States and Iran, or their authorized representatives. A consensus of credible reporting from major news agencies of record may also be used.

This market will resolve to “No” if the United States takes a qualifying military action against Iran by the specified date, 11:59 PM Iran Standard Time. Otherwise this market will resolve to “Yes.” A qualifying military action refers to an air strike or a surface-to-surface missile strike, initiated by the United States, that directly impacts Iran. An air strike includes bombs, air-to-surface missiles, and air-launched drones. A surface-to-surface missile strike includes one-way attack drones and surface-to-surface missiles such as cruise or ballistic missiles. The following actions do not constitute a qualifying military action: Munitions destroyed or intercepted before impact; Surface-to-air missile strikes; Small-arms fire; Ground incursions; Cyber operations; Naval gunfire and artillery fire; Howitzers, artillery pieces, mortars, and rocket artillery (e.g. MLRS systems); Minor surface-to-surface strikes, including short range loitering munitions, FPV drones, and ATGM strikes; Any threat, authorization, or announcement of force that has not been executed. Any munition that is intercepted or destroyed before impact does not constitute a qualifying military action. Debris, fragments, or any wreckage from intercepted munitions that land on Iran do not constitute a military action regardless of any damage incurred. “Iran” refers to the terrestrial territory of Iran, including its internal waters. Iran’s maritime territory and airspace are not encompassed. Where territorial borders are disputed, all territory claimed by and under the de facto control of Iran as of market creation will qualify. The occurrence, attribution, and timing of a qualifying military action will be primarily determined based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources. Where multiple sources conflict regarding the occurrence, attribution, or timing of a relevant military action, this market will remain open until the earlier of: i) the confirmation of the occurrence, attribution, and timing of the action based on a consensus of information available from the resolution sources or ii) 3 full calendar days (Iran Standard Time) from the date of the first credibly reported evidence of the action. If this period would extend past the end date, this market will remain open to allow for 3 full calendar days to pass. At the end of the third calendar day, if conflicting reports remain, the incident will be adjudicated based on the totality of information available from the resolution sources at that time. No single statement, denial, or presentation of evidence will govern where it is contradicted by the totality of information. The resolution sources for this market will be official information from the governments and militaries of the United States and Iran and a consensus of credible reporting.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if a diplomatic agreement between the United States and Iran over traffic in the strait of Hormuz is announced by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. A diplomatic agreement refers to an official agreement, treaty, deal, or substantially similar diplomatic instrument that establishes agreed actions, policies, obligations, or commitments between the United States and Iran. A qualifying diplomatic agreement must establish Iranian policies, obligations, or commitments aimed at permitting, restoring, or increasing vessel or shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. All listed countries must announce their acceptance of the same qualifying diplomatic agreement for the Payout Condition to be met. A joint announcement will qualify, as will separate announcements from each entity of its own acceptance of an agreement which, taken together, directly indicate that all the listed countries accepted the same agreement. Separate announcements of individual policies will not qualify if the policies are not announced as part of a diplomatic agreement. Each announcement must be a declarative statement that clearly and unambiguously communicates acceptance of an agreement. Statements that reference ongoing negotiations or a prospective agreement, or that allude to or express support for an agreement without confirming acceptance of the agreement, do not qualify. A qualifying announcement need not reference the agreement by name or use specific terminology, provided it clearly communicates acceptance of an agreement. Whether announcements from the listed countries represent a diplomatic agreement and whether such an agreement qualifies will be primarily determined through the announcements themselves. Where an announcement is made by all listed countries but, based on the announcements, it remains ambiguous whether the announcements represent a qualifying diplomatic agreement between the countries, this market will remain open until either i) definitive confirmation that the announcements represent a qualifying diplomatic agreement between the listed entities is achieved through further announcements from the listed countries or a consensus of credible reporting or ii) 14 calendar days (ET) have passed after the date that the last country made their first potentially qualifying announcement. If, at the end of the fourteenth calendar day, no definitive confirmation has been achieved, this market will resolve based on the totality of information available from the resolution sources at that time. No single statement, denial, or presentation of evidence will govern where it is contradicted by the totality of information. The resolution sources for this market will be official information from the governments of the United States and Iran and a consensus of credible reporting.

This market will resolve to “Yes” if IMF Portwatch publishes a 7-day moving average of transit calls (“Arrivals of Ships”) for the Strait of Hormuz equal to or above 60 for any date between market creation and December 31, 2026. Otherwise, this market will resolve to “No”. Daily transit calls include container, dry bulk, roll-on/roll-off, general cargo, and tanker ships. Ships not reported by IMF Portwatch will not be considered. This market will resolve as soon as IMF Portwatch publishes a 7-day moving average of transit calls equal to or above the specified level, or once data has been published for the final date in the specified period and no such value has been published. If no data has been published for the final date of the specified period within 14 calendar days (ET) after the end of that period, this market will resolve based on data published up to that point. Revisions to previously published data points made within this market’s timeframe will be considered. However, they will not disqualify a previously published data point from qualifying. Revisions to previously published data points after data is published for December 31, 2026, however, will not be considered. In case of obvious data integrity issues (i.e., erroneous data), the market may remain open until the end of the third calendar day (ET) after the date on which such data is first released to allow for corrections. Data integrity issues refer only to clerical or other similar errors in the underlying data, and do not include cases where IMF Portwatch differs from alternative sources. The resolution source for this market will be IMF Portwatch, specifically the transit calls data published for the Strait of Hormuz at https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/cb5856222a5b4105adc6ee7e880a1730, both in the chart and through downloadable files.

Resolution source: https://portwatch.imf.org/pages/cb5856222a5b4105adc6ee7e880a1730

If the 7-day moving average of transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz as reported by the IMF PortWatch is above 60 before January 1, 2027, then the market resolves to Yes.

If ICE reports that the maximum price of oil (as defined exclusively by the set of WTI front-month settle prices) is above $150 between Issuance and Dec 31, 2026, then the market resolves to Yes.